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Nearly fifteen years ago, Orville Freeman correctly predicted the growth
of Soviet demand for U.S. grain exports. Noting the tendency of Communist
regimes to fail at agriculture, Freeman asked facetiously whether, if the
Communists succeeded in taking over the world, there would be anyone left
to feed them (Freeman, 1969, p. 293). His tone reflected the American
confidence of those comparatively prosperous times. Over the last fifteen
years, significant increases in exports have tied agriculture ever closer to
American foreign policy. Today economic conditions, the burgeoning costs of
farm programs, and severe budget constraints have created a significant U.S.
reliance on Soviet grain imports, making it somewhat unclear who is feeding
whom. Unfortunately, those most intimately concerned with foreign policy making
often know little about agricultural producers’ priorities. These priorities
are only a partial function of Soviet actions, whereas bilateral U.S./Soviet
relations loom much larger in questions of foreign policy. Conversely, those
who make agricultural policy are given little access tc)the machinery of
foreign affairs. Former Agriculture Secretary Bergland once remarked that
he was not consulted over the Carter grain embargo - he was told.
I would like to explore in some detail the often clouded interaction
between agriculture and foreign policy, focusing specifically on certain
provisions of the 1981 farm bill and the recent Soviet/American grain agreement.
I believe that these issues can tell us something about what the 1985 Farm
Bill should strive for, and what it should avoid. I will make three general
points:
1. The international setting of American agriculture has created increased
instability for producers.
2. The legislative response to this instability has been inadequate.-2-
3. New farm legislation must confront instability by recognizing the
linkages between farm and foreign policy, and must build in the flexibility
necessary to respond to this new policy environment.
1. The international setting of American agriculture has created
increased instability.
On August 25th, Secretary Block announced a new long-term agreement that
gives the Soviet Union almost unconditional guarantees that future supplies
of grain contracted fromthe U.S. will not be interrupted. The agreement increases
minimum Soviet purchases from six to nine million metric tons and increases
non-negotiated maximums from eight to twelve million tons. Although these
purchases will occur at prevailing market prices, it allows substitution
of up to one ton of soybeans and soybean meal for two tons of grain, and
further specifies minimums of corn and wheat at four million tons each (New
York Times, August 26, 1983).
A significant change from earlier agreements is the absence of an “escape
clause” allowing the U.S. to back out in the event of a short crop less than
225 million tons. While the 225 figure was probably too small to be realistic,
larger figures proposed by American negotiators were rejected out of hand by
the Soviets. A second significant change is a provision promising that the
U.S. will never impose embargoes on either grain covered by the agreement or
contracted for above 12 million tons. As Secretary Block said in Moscow,
“We want not only to be a good supplier but the best supplier for the Soviet
Union” (Washington Post, August 26, 1983).
While disavowing the use of grain exports as a sign of displeasure with
Soviet behavior as well as the “distasteful” 1980 Carter embargo over Afghanistan,
the Secretary did not mention that negotiations leading to the agreement were
closely related to events in Poland. Grain talks were suspended by the
President in early 1982 over Poland, and were concluded only after the lifting-3-
of martial law there. Reminders of the link from food to foreign policy have
also occurred since the accord was signed. The downing of Korean flight 007
and the U.S. action in Grenada both provoked suggestions in the U.S. and the
USSR respectively that the agreement be suspended.
Outside of agriculture, opposition to the agreement in some foreign policy
circles has been harsh. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter’s irrepressible former
national security advisor, suggested that “what is truly distasteful is
Secretary Block crawling on his hands and knees to Moscow” (New York Times,
August 26, 1983). Earlier, the British trade Secretary pronounced U.S. efforts
to pressure the European allies into sanctions over Soviet gas pipeline construc-
tion as “repugnant,“ in light of what the Wall Street Journal.(November 6, 1981)
called the “almost obsequious” behavior of the Agriculture Department toward
the Soviets. “If the United States wants us to respect its equipment embargo,”
the French trade minister said, “let it start by not delivering millions of
tons of grain (to Russia)” (Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 10, 1982).
This is strong language among allies, reflecting the underlying instability
resulting from the “internationalization” of American agriculture. This
instability is driven in turn by the dramatic Increase in our export position.
The export instability problem has been felt especially since 1981, when the
volume of U.S. agricultural exports experienced a sharp decline. Until 1981,
U.S. farm exports had experienced an unparalleled period of growth. The
slippage of the U.S. position since then has led many to argue that a cure
can be found by returning America to “reliable supplier” status in world
markets.
I want to argue that too much emphasis on the “reliable supplier” issue
has obscured more fundamental threats to continued farm income stability.
Because U.S. farmers depend on exports, and because we hold a strong comparative
advantage in agriculture, it is critical that we recognize that many inter--4-
national forces will continue to affect us which are beyond the control of
such long-term agreements. Long-term agreements are only one, and probably
not the most important, kind of response to the instability of export earnings.
Even more significant are a variety of both domestic and international
economic actions including support programs and monetary and exchange rate
policles. Unlike diplomatic factors, which are often unforeseeable,a variety
of initiatives within the control of the U.S. Congress can reduce instability
and regain lost export earnings in agriculture.
In sum, the international setting of agriculture has created new sources
of instability for the American farmer. But the key and continuing role of
exports means that farm legislation cannot be divorced from the larger context
of foreign policy and international economics.
2. The legislative response to this instability has been inadequate.
An unfortunate response to the changing setting of American agriculture
has been to hide our head in the sand by trying (in vain) to separate agriculture
from international politics and economics. One example is the “sanctity of
contract” legislation signed by the President last January. Under that law,
if there were another embargo, shippers would have 270 days after its declaration
to deliver what they had sold before the cutoff. A second, and more dramatic,
example is the “embargo protection” clause of the 1981 farm bill, which is
now part of the permanent organic act. This provides that if there is an
embargo on trade of an agricultural commodity with another country, unless
it is an “across the board” action affecting all U.S. trade with that country,
or the exports of that commodity are less than three percent of total U.S.
exports in that year, substantial costs must be borne to compensate producers.
Deficiency payments must be made based on a target price of 100% of parity
and/or support prices must be raised to a 100% parity level. During hearings
on the 1981 bill, Congressman Tom Foley was told by Assistant Agriculture-5-
Secretary Lesher that the cost of such action for wheat and feed grains in
1980-81 alone would have been $30 billion.
While understandable as a defensive attempt to protect U.S. farmers from
instability in the foreign policy area, I believe that these provisions, by
themselves and in their present form, are both inadequate and unwise. Trying
to separate agriculture from international forces in this way reduces overall
flexibility. Being a reliable supplier of exports is certainly important, but
these provisions try to achieve this end by insisting, under penalty of
deficit, that policy makers ignore the farm/foreign policy link. This situation
creates a serious dilemma if any embargoes are undertaken. On the one hand,
sanctity of contract provisions and deficiency and loan rate payments may not
be enforced in the larger interest of national security, reemphasizing the
separation of agriculture and foreign policy and demonstrating the weakness of
agriculture as a national priority. On the other hand, if they are enforced, the
public may react quite strongly to payments made to farmers as the price of
their support for such an action. While these provisions are designed to
protect farmers from being singled out as victims of an embargo, their
Implementation would create the opposite impression - of special favors to
the sector in a time of national crisis.
The more general problem is that rather than building in flexibility in
the face of instability, such provisions take flexibility away. This lack of
flexibility also characterizes the new long-term agreement - especially the
absence of a “short supply” provision - creating the possibility of a more
unstable policy environment overall.
Preoccupation with the reliable supplier issue has also had other, more
serious consequences. There are a number of reasons to believe that the impact-6-
of the Carter grain embargo was a less significant cause of reduced export
volume than more fundamental economic forces. Therefore, reliable supplier
provisions are responding to a cause of instability which is misplaced. The
Carter trade sanctions certainly created major shocks in the futures markets
and led to loss of market share. Our share of world trade has declined over
the last four years compared to the 1976-80 period from 56 to 50 percent.
But a look at relative prices for U.S. exports suggests that the embargo is
probably not the most important explanation for the relative decline in U.S.
exports. In the wheat market, both Canadian and Argentine prices fell relative
to U.S. prices from 1980 to 1983, with Argentine prices falling from 116% of
U.S. prices in 1980 to 77% of U.S. prices in May, 1983. In corn, Argentine
prices fell from 123% of U.S. prices in 1980 to 96% of U.S. prices in May
of 1983. The relative loss of this competitive edge suggests that even
without the embargo, the Soviets might have bought more from Argentina. Given
the embargo, U.S. loss of competitiveness made recovery of market share even
more difficult. The conclusion is that we cannot make up with long-term
agreements what we lose by noncompetitive prices (Brooks, 1983).
If we are interested in the cause of these losses in competitiveness,
the embargo is a convenient villain. But the underlying problems are more
fundamental: exchange rates and U.S. monetary policy, together with an
inflexible structure of domestic price supports which creates additional
obstacles to export competitiveness. Over the past two years, the U.S. dollar
has risen roughly 25 percent, depending on how a basis period is chosen.
At the same time, the real.value of our principal exports - corn, soybeans
and wheat - remained approximately constant in relation to our domestic currency.
But in terms of the currencies of those countries importing U.S. grain, the
value of the loan rates rose by approximately the 25 percent that the value of
the dollar rose on a trade-weighted basis. Against an index of foreign curren--7-
cies, the impact has been dramatic. Over the last three years, importers’
prices have moved steadily up in relation to farm prices.
As Schuh as argued, this has choked off the quantity of U.S. exports
demanded (Schuh, 1983a). USDA estimates are that increases in the value of the
dollar cost U.S. exporters 16 million tons of grain in 1981-82, 10 million
of which was corn. A second effect is that the high relative prices of these
commodities in terms of the currencies of other countries, shored up by the
price floor established by our loan rates, provides strong incentives for
countries such as Argentina to increase output and then underbid U.S. producers
while we hold the umbrella of high support prices for the international market.
As Schuh argues, “if we were to set out to design a system that would cause
us to lose market share, we would be hard pressed to design a better”one.”
In short, the fundamental lack of competitiveness resulting from the strength of
the dollar, combined with high levels of price supports, is not addressed
by a policy predicated on “reliable supply.” Who wants a reliable supplier if
It costs them an arm and a leg?
A last reason why grain agreements with the Russians and reliable supplier
measures do not address the underlying problem of reducing instability facing
U.S. producers turns on the difficulty of reading Russian motives and inten-
tions. The Kremlin remains a kind of black box, which U.S. policy makers
still do not understand well. Therefore, American farm policy should not
be hostage to Soviet grain purchases if more attractive options for increasing
prices and incomes exist, including restorations of balance to budgets which
are driven deeper and deeper into deficit by levels of defense spending justified -
ironically in light of our concern for Soviet import needs - by explanations
of Soviet bellicosity. This is especially true when options such as reductions
in price supports are well within the control area of U.S. policy makers,
rather than locked inside the enigma of the Kremlin.-8-
This is not to argue against long-term agreements. However, because the
forces affecting them are often outside the control of American farmers, the
Congress, or the Executive, they are inherently less stable than other options.
Too much of U.S. producers’ welfare should not be put in the arms of the Russian
bear.
Furthermore, what little we do know about Soviet plans is not especially —
encouraging. D. Gale Johnson and Karen Brooks have argued that Soviet grain
imports on the order of 30 million tons will probably be needed into the 1980’s,
but are likely to decline due to improvements in feed efficiency, non-grain
feeds such as hay, and modest improvements in worker incentives. Brooks
notes that “The U.S., therefore should not count on a large and expanding
(Soviet) demand for grain.” It will more likely be declining over t~me
(Brooks, 1983).
Finally, no matter how much we want to be a reliable supplier, it is
clear that the Soviets have no intention of making the U.S. their only supplier
in the future. Soviet long-term import comnutments have already been nego-
tiated with Argentina, Canada, Hungary, and Brazil. Like good portfolio
managers, they are hedging their bets. The fact that this is occurring,
no matter how benign our interpretation of Soviet motives, suggests that the
U.S. would do well to pursue a corresponding diversification of export markets.
3. New farm legislation must confront instability by recognizing the
linkages between farm and foreign policy, and must build in the flexibility
necessary to respond to this new policy environment.
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating renewed use of U.S. food as
a weapon, which makes no sense as either agricultural or foreign policy. Instead,
framers of the 1985 farm bill and subsequent farm legislation must decide how
domestic price supports and other stabilization programs fit with the overall
trade posture of the U.S., including monetary and exchange rate policy and-9-
longer term foreign policy agreements. It will then be possible to structure
programs with the flexibility necessary to absorb some of the income instability
which U.S. farmers have experienced.
I have three major suggestions about how this might be achieved. As a
first step, building in stability will require downward flexibility in support
levels. Loan programs originally designed for stabilization purposes have
ended up being used for support purposes. Rather than using loan rates as a
form of compensation - as the current farm bill requires - they should be set
so that commodity prices can decline when the value of the dollar rises.
As Schuh (1983a) argues, this can be done in a variety of ways, including
indexing of loan levels and target prices to the value of the dollar, or some
other countervailing adjustment rule. If this means scaling back supports
substantially, then other more flexible means of supporting farm prices and
incomes need to be implemented. Two especially useful concepts are options
markets for farm commodities and a properly designed income insurance plan,
both of which merit further study (see Congressional Budget Office, 1983a).
Second, increases In competitiveness must be accompanied by a strong
program of export diversification. We need to look beyond the Soviet Union,
just as they are looking beyond us, and create cond~tions favorable to U.S.
exports across the board. If our exports are truly competitive, this will
not require large export subsidies. Indeed, export subsidies, like any net
additions to the unacceptable and deeply threatening federal deficit, will
contribute to a stronger dollar and transfer income away from the United States
to those countries importing subsidized commodities, creating additional
problems for U.S. competitiveness. A recent Congressional Budget Office study (1981b)
suggests that export subsidies may further increase uncertainty and instability
by promoting foreign import restrictions, as well as diplomatic and trade
sanctions outside of agriculture. Again, agricultural policy cannot and should
not be divorced from this larger context.-1o-
Food aid, in contrast, remains a valuable tool of market creation and
development assistance, which can advance both foreign and agricultural policy
goals at the same time that it helps to provide a basis for continued
economic growth in recipient nations. This implies, however, that food aid
-,
must be targeted where
agricultural exports.
it will do the most good for both foreign policy and
If it is used merely as a way to dump surpluses on those
unwilling to sustain their own programs of agricultural development, its
long-term effects will be to exact retaliation from our allies without promot-
ing growth and resulting specialization and increases in demand.
Finally, the United States must be willing to supply export credits
targeted where they are needed most, especially in the current period of
international credit rationing brought on by irresponsible private sector lend-
ing. A variety of USDA credit programs can be given expanded budget authority
(see Schuh, 1983b). Credit expansion, I should
This view is reflected in increases proposed by
and 1985, from about $3 billion to $7.8 billion
1985.
add, is not subsidy expansion.
the Administration for FY 1984
next year and $8.5 billlon in
In conclusion, we cannot separate farm policy from foreign policy. Framers
of the 1985 Farm Bill need to Identify the structure of international inter-
dependence which has resulted from America’s comparative advantage in agricul-
ture and exploit it, while building in the flexibility necessary to protect
farmers from the instability which results. This will require a careful
review of current farm policies with specific attention to the institutions,
international and domestic, that must play a role. These institutions
include not only the Department of Agriculture and the State Department, but
a variety of international monetary institutions and agreements. Without this
wider planning base, agricultural policy and agricultural producers will
continue to be victimized by forces outside of their control. With such a-11-
base, new policies can be tailored to adjust to change in an international
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